

# Strengthening Health Emergency Preparedness, Response and Resilience


WGIHR Briefing

*23 June 2023*




# Strengthening Health Emergency Preparedness, Response & Resilience (HEPR)


Based on independent reviews,  
synthesising **+300 recommendations** ...



... **developed in consultation** with Member States & partners, presented at the World Health Assembly May 2022



# Financing: Strengthening the global architecture for health emergency preparedness & response



## G20 joint finance and health taskforce


- WHO and World Bank estimated annual preparedness financing needs (USD 30bn) with significant financing gap (USD 8bn)

## Established Pandemic Fund

- Provide dedicated, **additional** long-term funding for PPR
- **Complement** existing PPR institutions & work by addressing gaps
- Promote **coordination** among key agencies working on PPR
- **Incentivize** increased investments by countries & partners
- **US\$ 1.7 Billion** in pledges from over 24 donors to date

**Scalable and predictable response financing mechanisms being discussed in the India G20 and Japan G7**

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
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Scalable and predictable response financing mechanisms being discussed in the India G20 and Japan G7




# US\$31.1 Bn need/year calculated by updating G20 HLIP & related work; US\$10.5 Bn gap/year calculated using representative data points



1. Assumes LICs should be supported at 100% of their needs, while LMICs would be supported up to 60%, and UMICs up to 20%. Consistent with approach for Financing Framework of the ACT-Accelerator endorsed by Facilitation Council Financial Working Group including representatives of Canada, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Norway, South Africa, UK, USA  
2. Conservative estimate based on annual reports from CEPI, FIND, GAVI, The Global Fund, UNICEF, WHO

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
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Scalable and predictable response financing mechanisms being discussed in the India G20 and Japan G7

# Financing: The Pandemic Fund aims to provide dedicated and catalytic financing for PPR: First Fund Call for Proposals issued March 3 – Due May 19

## Structure and operations



## Objectives and first call for proposals




### Objectives of Pandemic Fund

- Fostering coordination nationally (across sectors within countries), and among countries regionally and globally
- Incentivizing additional investments in pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response
- Building capacity/demonstrating capability
- Ensuring administrative/operational efficiency of PF

• **Countries eligible to receive funding** from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and/or International Development Association (IDA)


• **Priorities** include Surveillance, Laboratory Systems, and Human Resources/Workforce Strengthening

# Financing: Leveraging opportunity of Pandemic Fund proposal development






# The first Pandemic Fund call for proposals will result in \$2.1 Bn unmet funding requests, highlighting significant additional financing needs for preparedness



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Over 60% of applications included 2+ implementing entities




85% of country submitted proposals identified WHO as an implementing entity



# The first Pandemic Fund call for proposals will result in \$2.1 Bn unmet funding requests, highlighting significant additional financing needs for preparedness

Over 92% of eligible LICs and 80% of eligible LMICs submitted applications




Broad geographical distribution with 56% of applications from AF and AM regions



The first Pandemic Fund call for proposals will result in **\$2.3 Bn** unmet funding requests, highlighting significant additional financing needs for HEPR

### Funding requested and amount available in first Pandemic Fund call for proposals, \$ Bn




### Observations

- **133** eligible proposals totaling **\$2.1 Bn** in funding requested against \$300 Mn available for first Pandemic Fund call for proposals, which will result in **\$1.8 Bn** unmet funding requests
- The important effort invested in the application process to produce the documentation required can be leveraged to develop **National Investment Plans (NIPs)**
- **The purpose of NIPs is to mobilize additional financing and match donor priorities with country needs,** helping ensure the Pandemic Fund fulfills objective of being catalytic

# Financing, preparedness activities, and multisectoral actions can be integrated to support investment cases for health emergency capabilities at a national level

Member States have completed...

180 State Part Self-Assessments (SPARs) since 2017<sup>1</sup>



116 Joint External Evaluations (JEEs)



79 National Action Plans for Health Security (NAPHS)




## Building on IHR assessments & NAPHS



## National Investment Plan

for financing for health emergency preparedness, prevention & resilience

## Strengthening systems & resilience



## Assessing risks & addressing specific threats



Assessing risks




Developing and executing threat specific plans



Map existing funding sources, identify critical gaps & mobilize additional resources



# Financing: Strengthening the global architecture for health emergency preparedness & response



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**Scalable and predictable response financing mechanisms being discussed in the India G20 and Japan G7**

# Context | The G20 JFHTF and the G7 Health Working Group are both interested in understanding and improving pandemic response financing



Estimated annual preparedness financing needs (USD 30bn) with significant financing gap (USD 8bn)



**The Pandemic Fund**  
FOR A RESILIENT WORLD

& other domestic, bilateral, public/private-sector, MDB preparedness investments

*The G20 is committed to addressing gaps in financing the pandemic response...*



“...we welcome ... [a] JFHTF strategy to guide joint finance-health sector readiness to support a global response to future pandemics, including through a report on best practices and exploring how surge financing mechanisms could be made operational, duly considering discussions in other global forums...”

G20 Bengaluru FMCBG Chair Summary, 15 February 2023

*This is aligned with other commitments including from the G7...*



**G7 JAPAN**  
2023


“...we commit to work with the G20 JFHTF and our international partners to thoroughly assess how the existing financing sources, particularly untapped funding streams, can be used in pandemic “response” and to explore a “surge” financing framework...”

G7 Nagasaki Health Ministers' Communiqué, 14 May 2023

Prevent & Prepare


Respond

# Scope | Mapping focuses on existing international financing options, acknowledging the primary importance of domestic plans and financing





# Methodology | Existing financing options have been mapped against response financing needs to understand current status and gaps



# Framework | Response financing starts domestically, but multilaterals further support initial response & coordination, L(M)ICs, & access to MCMs

Levels	Needs	Financing Mechanisms
Country Level Response	National health response incl. collab surveillance, community protection, safe & scalable care while maintaining essential health services, access to MCMs & national emergency coordination	1.1 Domestic emergency response financing & non-contingent external financing
	Social & economic response to protect livelihoods, jobs, & businesses including scaling of social protection schemes, exceptional support to businesses to mitigate impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions	1.2 Contingent external financing
	Macroeconomic interventions to use fiscal resources transparently during the implementation of the response, & preserve financial stability, such as implementing monetary easing, & liquidity provisions	1.3 New external financing after the crisis hits
Global & Regional Response	Ensure swift characterization of the threat, support to the initial response, threat containment and ongoing communications & coordination	2.1 Contingent financing and pre-committed grants for global rapid response and coordination
	Support countries with technical assistance, operational support, in-kind contributions, financing, and assist in purchase of MCMs	2.2 Response-specific bilateral and multilateral support to countries excluding MDBs
	Support at-risk investment R&D, manufacturing and to secure volumes of MCMs to enable equitable access	2.3 At-risk financing to ensure access to MCMs

# Mapping & Gap Analysis | Although large amount of funding made available, delays and lack of coordination impeded effectiveness

## National Response

**1.1**  
Domestic emergency response financing & non-contingent external financing

*Out of scope (domestic mechanisms only)*

**1.2**  
Contingent external financing options

**14** incl. mechanisms hosted/ delivered by:



*Summary of findings*

Many contingent financing instruments, not necessarily well coordinated with national response priorities or released on Day Zero. Not all countries have dedicated, pre-negotiated instruments for pandemic crisis contingent financing.

COVID-19 retrospective:

Available to date:  
**~US\$250 B**

**1.3**  
New external financing options after the crisis hits

**7** incl. mechanisms hosted/ delivered by:



*Summary of findings*

Takes time to put new instruments in place & develop projects with governments but streamlined processes mitigate. Options need to be better coordinated. Many countries unwilling to use concessional financing in case grants later became available.

Implemented:  
**~US\$10-15 B**

*Estimate based on limited data availability*

Note: In context of World Bank operation disbursement equivalent to allocations

# Mapping & Gap Analysis | Lack of coordination and timeliness impacted response with key gap in at-risk financing

## Global and Regional Response

**2.1**  
Contingent financing and pre-committed grant options for global rapid response and coordination

**7** incl. mechanisms hosted/ delivered by:

Summary of findings

Significant funding made available in first year, however gap of US\$0.5 B in first 28 days of response. Funding came with limited predictability due to reliance on appeals.

COVID-19 retrospective: Available year 1: **~US\$2.5 B** Implemented: **~100%**

**2.2**  
Response-specific bilateral and multilateral support options to countries excluding MDBs

**16** incl. mechanisms hosted/ delivered by:

Summary of findings

Significant funding made available, but was delayed, unpredictable & poorly coordinated with MDBs. No chance of frontloading due to no early pledges. Implementation impacted by funding delays & lack of emergency SOPs.

COVID-19 retrospective<sup>2</sup>: Available Q1 '22: **~US\$18 B** Implemented by Q1 '22: **~40%**

**2.3**  
At-risk financing options to ensure access to MCMs

**14** incl. mechanisms hosted/ delivered by:

Summary of findings

Significant gap in at-risk financing (~US\$9 B). Limited number of instruments can take an at-risk position, with historical heavy skew towards vaccines.

COVID-19 retrospective<sup>2</sup>: Available Q1 '22: **~US\$13 B** Implemented by Q1 '22: **~40%<sup>3</sup>**

1. The Diagnostics Consortium for COVID-19 was an inter-agency mechanism created at the request of the UN Secretary General to secure volumes of COVID-19 tests and allocate them among over 160 countries with limited market access, according to agreed principles. Over 50 members were involved 2. Based on HSRC analysis Q1 2022 3. Based on Gavi, Unitaid, CEPI, AVAT, FIND Dx

## Next steps | the JFHTF may wish to consider the potential path forward

- Further elaborate the mapping and gap analysis for consideration of the G20 JFHMM in August
- Frame the objectives, scope & framework of an "operational playbook" to codify pandemic response financing processes
- Develop proposals to optimize existing response financing for speed, coordination, and at-risk financing, for further deliberation by the JFHTF

# Framework to evaluate Pandemic Vulnerabilities and Risks (FEVR)

Framework to measure health, social and economic vulnerabilities...

...to manage pandemic risks through informed policies and investments in preparedness and resilience



## Health system resilience & response

- Health Expenditure per capita
- Logistics Index
- Physicians per 1,000 population
- UHC Service coverage
- International Health Regulations



## Social & economic protection

- Informal economy relative to GDP
- Food insecurity index
- Social protection benefit coverage
- Internet connectivity



## Macroeconomic stability

- Population with bank savings
- Share of export in the GDP
- Credit to private sector
- Global Value Chain
- Agriculture & tourism



- 1 What are the **current risks and vulnerabilities** for pandemics and **where are investments required to maximise preparedness and resilience** to minimize the health, social, and economic impact?
- 2 What are the **types of policy responses, associated costs, and differential impacts between health, social, and economic outcomes** of different mitigation measures?



**World Health  
Organization**